It is to be noted that the principle of liability was put forward in the case of “Rylands v Fletcher” (1866) holds a defendant accountable if, in the course of using their land in a non-natural way, they accumulate thereon anything likely to cause harm if it escapes for their own advantage, and such substance does escape, leading towards damages.
.While dealing with case “Cambridge Goff Water Co. v Eastern Counties Leather plc”, it has been stated by Lord Goff that the foundational origins of the principle during the case “Rylands v Fletcher” stemmed from the tort of nuisance, with Rylands representing a specific manifestation of that tort concerning isolated instances of escape. Later on, the House of Lords decided to endorse this approach during the case “Transco Plc. v Stockport Metropolitan Borough Council” (2004), where Lord Bingham reaffirmed Blackburn J's explanation that the condition of the case “Rylands v Fletcher” constituted a straightforward case of nuisance.
Furthermore, the principle laid down during the case “Rylands v Fletcher” has in fact originated from the notion of nuisance, with a crucial overlap between the two torts. There have been various factual scenarios wherein the claimant could prevail under either “Rylands v Fletcher” or nuisance. During the case “Read v Lyons” (1947), Lord Simonds signified Blackburn J's initial formulation of the principle, illustrating that in the majority of the cases, the law of nuisance and the rule in Rylands may be invoked interchangeably.
It is worth going through that during the case “Cambridge Water Co”, it was established by Lord Goff that there exists a comparison between the non-natural utilization of land during the case “Rylands” and the theory of unreasonable use in the tort of nuisance. In the same way, in “Ellison v Ministry of Defence”, the presiding judge appeared inclined towards such a decision.
As per the prevalent consensus that nuisance and Rylands are connected with each other, it wasn't surprising that the House of Lords, during the case “Cambridge Water”, was of the view that liability under “Rylands v Fletcher”, similar to nuisance, arises only when the damage suffered by the claimant was foreseeable (though this does not necessitate foreseeability of the damage itself, constituting the strict liability aspect). The precondition of foreseeability of damage thwarted the claim made by the claimant during the case “Cambridge Water”, a notion reiterated by Lord Hoffman in “Transco”.
During the case “Transco” it was established by the House of Lords that a link exists between the principles governing standing and damage for the torts of nuisance and “Rylands”, affirming that the concept that the rule in “Rylands” is a subset of nuisance.
In the same way, only people with a proprietary or possessory interest in land have the right to sue. Furthermore, their Lords
During the case “Read v Lyons”, recognizing that liability as per the case “Rylands v Fletcher” doesn’t move forward to have personal injury, thus reinforcing the correlation between nuisance and Rylands.
During the case “Transco v Stockport MBC”, it has been deliberated by the House of Lords to establish whether it was necessary to maintain the rule in “Rylands v Fletcher” as an independent tort or if it should be adjusted within the tort of negligence. Later on, in Australia the question also arose, where the High Court of Australia, during the case “Burnie Port Authority v General Jones Pty Ltd” (1994), predominantly integrated the rule into the system of negligence. On the other hand, given its close affinity with nuisance, as it was observed particularly during the cases such as “Cambridge”, there was consideration for formally incorporating it within the scope of nuisance. Nevertheless, during the case “Transco” all five members of the HL turned down arguments advocating for the termination of the rule's separate existence, albeit with changing standards of enthusiasm.
The reason as per which Lord Hoffman thinks that it is necessary to uphold the rule was its longstanding existence, meaning that it would exceed the judicial role to abolish it at this juncture.
Lord Walker thought that it would be undesirable to stretch the law of negligence so as to exact a degree of care so stringent as to amount practically to a guarantee of safety. Non-natural use of land is a different concept from the negligent use of land (McHugh J had pointed this in his dissenting judgement in the Austrian High Court in Burnie). Lord Walker noted that, although the scope of Rylands have been restricted by the growth of statutory regulation for hazardous activities and the continuing development of law of negligence it would be premature that the principle was for practical purposes obsolete.
It is worth noting that the attempts to somehow merge the “Rylands” with the concept of “tort of negligence” has been turned down by Lord Bingham. While explaining his views, he stated that if an occupier of land can illustrate that another occupier has introduced or maintained an inherently hazardous substance under extraordinary or unusual conditions, the former occupier has the right, as per my thinking, to seek redress from the latter occupier of that same land for any resulting damage to their property interest which resulted due to the escape of concerned substance, without the need for proving negligence, subject to the defenses of “Act of God or the acts of a third party”. Therefore, it should be noted that within the contemporary explanation of the case “Rylands v Fletcher”, the level of care exercised by the defendant to avoid the escape remains immaterial, as liability remains strict.
In this condition, an issue arises asking that why aspecific aspect of what is previously treated as “private nuisance law” should be subject to a distinct liability system from private nuisance itself. For this issue, a commonly used justification lies in the discernible differences between the two concerned torts. Rylands is in fact predicated upon the non-natural buildup by the defendant on their land that possesses a propensity for causing harm if it escapes. This concept inherently excludes substances naturally taking place within the boundaries of the defendant's land, as established during the case “Noble v Harrison” (1926). Conversely, liability in nuisance might ensure from natural occurences on the lands, as it has been witnessed during “Leakey v National Trust”. Furthermore, in Rylands, the accumulation of a tangible substance, that could escape or emit fumes or gasses, acts as a requirement for the liability, whereas in
nuisance, no physical object with such features is required to be present on the defendant's land.
Furthermore, as per the “Rylands”, the liability might be incurred regardless of the fact whether precautions were taken to ensure that the substance doesn’t escape and irrespective of whether the escape was predictable.
It is worth mentioning that in nuisance, the liability of the defendant is merely for the damages which originate due to managing the state affairs negligently, where it is reasonably predictable that such management might result in damaging the land belonging to the claimant.
Furthermore, during the case Rylands, it is worth mentioning that the occupier bears liability for the accumulation and escape caused by an independent contractor, whereas in nuisance, the scope of liability for independent contractors is more limited.
It is to be noted that the requirements for liability might vary. A distinct difference is that during the case “Ryland v Fletcher”, a non-natural usage of land is required instead of the nuisance which has a requirement for “unreasonable use of land”. Furthermore, it has been stated by Nolan (2005) that the crux of the unreasonable user issue lies in finding out if the interference with the claimant's land is tolerable or not. Hence, the initial most focus is not entirely upon the nature of the defendant's actions, even though this is a factor to think upon, but rather on whether the resulting discomfort or uneasiness is reasonable for the claimant to endure given the circumstances.
Furthermore, it’s debatable if the historical origins of the rule during the case “Rylands v Fletcher” can be entirely attributed to the tort of nuisance. It has been stated by various academic scholars that the Rylands has been derived from a broader, albeit ambiguous, principle within the old legal framework of severe liability for resulting in harm. This principle was found to be significantly divergent from private nuisance, which is mainly concerned with the safeguarding of property rights.
It is to be noted that there exists a division between the legal scholars regarding the retention of the rule in its present state. It is worth mentioning that “Nolan” (2005) is of the view that it should’ve been extirpated, whereas in the viewpoint of Murphy (2004) the rule represents a valuable residual mechanism for ensuring environmental protection amongst people affected by harmful emissions from industrial units.
Furthermore it should be noted that the issue is still considered debatable; as it has been highlighted during the case “Transco”, a number of challenges have arisen, with no reported cases successfully relying upon the rule since the “Second World War”. Furthermore, even though the examples of the fire variant of Rylands exist, the Court of Appeal recently ruled that this variant contracts established precedent and shouldn’t be treated as sound law (Stannard v Gore (2013)). It has also been indicated by the decision in “Transco” that successful actions are unlikely. Nevertheless, during the case of “Color Quest Ltd v Total Downstream UK Plc” (2009), stemming from extensive explosions at an oil storage depot in 2005, the defendants admitted liability to certain claimants under the rule in the case “Rylands v Fletcher”.