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Total: [2977 words]

QUESTION 1

(1) whether Congress can exercise the Commerce Clause to pass the PDA?

The potential parties here are the State of Samfox as the Plaintiff and the U.S. as the

Defendant.

The Defendant would argue that Art. 1 §8 of the Commerce Clause allows Congress to

regulate interstate economic matters. Justice Marshall in Gibbon has provided Congress a broad

and significant commerce power. Congress is not limited to its enumerated powers but can do

anything not prohibited by the Constitution. McCulloch. In Jones & Laughlin, a permissible notion

for the new commerce clause is that Congress can regulate commerce that substantially affects

interstate commerce.

Here, the Defendant would argue that if peacorn is traded across states or substantially

affects interstate commerce, Congress has the authority to regulate under the Commerce Clause

by giving Stenchtech's enhanced patent protection and federal subsidy. The subsidy for crummi-

free peacorn could be justified as regulating interstate commerce, as crummium affects

peacorn's marketability nationally.

Here, the Plaintiff would argue that Congress is not directly regulating peacorn itself.

Instead, Congress intervenes a non-economic matter through special patent protection and a federal

subsidy. Moreover, federal subsidy's aim to develop crummium-free peacorn involves regulating

a product at the state level, infringing free competition and state sovereignty.

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In my opinion, the court would rule for the Plaintiff because the courts have been more restrictive lately and hold a strong 10th Amendment view, as we see in Lopez, U.S. v. Morrison, and Sebelius. Therefore, federal intervention should be limited to matters directly related to interstate commerce.

(2) whether the Congress can regulate Stentech based in the State of Abhall through FISB?

The potential parties here are the State of Abhall and Stentech as the Plaintiffs and the U.S. as the Defendant.

The Plaintiffs would argue a strong 10th Amendment view and that the Congress through FISB trying to regulate public interest trumps state’s autonomy. Darby.

Here, establishment of FISB and its functions, including distributing subsidy funds, monitoring Stentech's use of the funds, and reporting to Congress on any mismanagement, represent an intrusion into state matters. They might argue that these actions exceed Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause and encroach upon the sovereignty of the State of Abhall.

On the other hand, the Defendant would argue a weak 10th Amendment view and that the federal government should be given the latitude to regulate for bigger objectives. Wickard; Raich.

Besides, Congress may regulate states’ activities, using its Commerce Clause powers, provided that the regulation does not require the state to enact any laws or regulations and does not require state officials to assist in enforcing federal statutes regulating private individuals. Reno v. Condon; Garcia.

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Here, the Defendant would argue that since the PDA does not compel states to enact laws

or require state officials to enforce federal regulations, it falls within Congress's authority under

the Commerce Clause.

In my opinion, the court would rule for the Defendant because establishing the FISB and

its functions under the PDA are constitutional exercises of federal government under the

Commerce Clause, as they aim to regulate interstate commerce.

(3) whether the President has the power to remove members of the FISB at

will?

The potential parties here are the removed FISB member as the Plaintiff and the U.S. as

the Defendant.

The President would argue that he has the power under Art. 2 § 2 Cl. 2. First, we refer to

Art. 2 to determine whether there is any constitutional authorization. If yes, then it is a valid

executive action. Otherwise, whether there is any express authorization by Congress or statute.

The President may not act without express authorization from Congress or the text of the

Constitution. Youngstown. The Constitution grants the president the sole power to remove

executive officers. Myers.

Here, the President could argue that the FISB functions are executive rather than legislative

because they involve enforcement and oversight. Hence, the President may remove FISB officers

at will.

On the other hand, the Plaintiff would have a weaker argument by relying on separation of

powers. The president's power to remove an executive branch official does not apply to officials

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with legislative or judicial functions. Humphrey's. Here, the Plaintiff would need to distinguish

Myers and argue that the FISB is at least a quasi-legislative like the FTC.

In my opinion, the court would rule for the Defendant because the PDA's provision shows

that FISB functions as an executive and it is for the Plaintiff to prove otherwise.

(4) whether the SARA is constitutional?

The potential parties here are the U.S. as the Plaintiff and the State of Samfox as the

Defendant.

First, we need to determine whether Congress has the power to regulate. Next, whether the

Congress try to regulate. If both are answered in the affirmative, there will be federal preemption

when state try to regulate because of Supremacy Clause. Hunter Lessee; Gibbon.

Under the Modern Dormant Commerce Clause, we need to determine whether, firstly, the

discriminatory regulations are per se unlawful because even facially neutral regulation that may

reveal discrimination in their purposes and/or effects. Baldwin. Secondly, whether non-

discriminatory regulations that unduly burden interstate commerce are lawful unless the burden on

interstate commerce clearly outweighs the regulation's local benefits (Pike balancing test). H.P.

Hood.

Here, the Plaintiff would argue that SARA's ban on the production, release, and importation

of substances damaging to agricultural production in Samfox violates the Modern Dormant

Commerce Clause. While appearing facially neutral, the immediate embargo on peacorn suggests

potential discrimination against peacorn producers, which is per se unlawful. Clover Leaf

Creamery. Even if SARA is considered non-discriminatory, it could fail the Pike balancing test by

imposing undue burdens on interstate commerce without clearly outweighing its local benefits,

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thus rendering it unconstitutional. Moreover, the Plaintiff would argue that state actions inconsistent with federal action authorized by the Constitution are per se invalid. McCulloch.

Besides, when Congress regulates interstate commerce, states may not regulate to the contrary because of federal preemption. Gibbon.

On the other hand, Defendant would argue that there is an environmental concern and that the out-of-state particles present a unique harm, which is justifiable for the ban. Maine v. Taylor & United States.

Here, SARA’s ban serves a legitimate local purpose, and there are no available less discriminatory means to accomplish that same purpose.

In my opinion, the court would rule for the Defendant because SARA violates Dormant Commerce Clause and Supremacy Clause.

The potential parties here are the State of Seagle as the Prosecution and the President Firefly as the Defendant.

The Defendant would argue that he is entitled for absolute privilege for president’s immunity. Alternatively, argue for qualified privilege. However, the court is likely to rule against the Defendant because three branches’ interests are equally important. U.S. v. Nixon. A state criminal prosecution may subpoena a sitting president’s records without a heightened showing of need. Vance.

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Here, State of Siegle may be able to prosecute President Firefly under a state criminal

statute for credible threats of bodily harm. In my opinion, the court is likely rule for the

Prosecution.

[1244 words]

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QUESTION 2

(1A) whether the State Police Department responding slowly and inadequately to violent attacks on Bandrikans, constitute a 13th Amendment violation?

The potential Plaintiffs are the Bandrikans and the Defendant is the State Police Department.

The Plaintiffs would argue that the 13th Amendment may be enforced against private individuals and states when there is a physical or legal restraint. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. Here, the slow and inadequate response of the police to violent attacks on Bandrikans could constitute a violation of the 13th Amendment because there was a physical or legal restraint on the Bandrikans' freedom due to the failure of law enforcement to adequately protect them.

On the other hand, the Defendant would argue that the 13th Amendment does not apply because this does not make Bandrikans slaves.

(1B) whether employers refused to consider qualified Bandrikans for jobs, constitutes a 14th Amendment violation?

The potential Plaintiffs are the Bandrikans and the Defendants are the Employers.

While the 14th Amendment forbids state government from engaging race discrimination but it does not forbid private individuals. 14th Amendment does not authorize Congress to outlaw interracial violence. Civil Rights Cases. Here, the Defendant would argue that the 14th Amendment forbids state governments from engaging in race discrimination, but it does not prohibit discrimination by private individuals or entities.

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In short, unless there are state laws or regulations prohibiting such discrimination, the

employers' actions may not be considered a violation of the 14th Amendment.

(2) whether BISA imposes an additional 20% of federal tax is valid?

The potential Plaintiffs are the Companies and the Defendant is the IRS.

Congress may not attempt to regulate through a tax power and when it imposes a tax with

a prohibitory and regulatory effect and purpose, it is attempting to regulate local behavior. It is

irrelevant that the taxes are also generating revenue. Child Labor. Here, it is clear that Congress

tries to regulate local behavior by penalizing employers for discriminating Bandrikans.

On the other hand, the IRS may argue that as long as tax raises revenue court would not

inquire into motive/effect unless it is punitive. Kahriger. Here, the primary purpose of the tax

increase is to generate revenue for federal government programs supporting the resettlement and

assimilation of Bandrikans immigrants. Thus, valid.

In my opinion, the court is likely to rule for the IRS because tax power has broad subject

matter coverage.

(3) whether Congress can abrogate state immunity for private action under

the 11th Amendment / whether BISA §2 is constitutional?

The potential Plaintiffs are the Bandrikans and the Defendant is the state law enforcement

agency.

The Plaintiff would need to determine whether he is suing his own state or another state.

Hans. Next, he needs to determine if there is congressional abrogation for damages under the 14th

Amendment because the 14th Amendment grants Congress the power to enforce substantive rights

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and overrides states’ sovereign immunity. Fitzpatrick. Besides, it also needs to satisfy the congruent and proportionate test under §5 of the 14th Amendment. Here, there is clear congressional abrogation “...may sue the relevant state law enforcement agency for damages” so BISA §2 is constitutional.

On the other hand, the Defendant would argue that BISA is passed using Commerce power and hence cannot abrogate sovereign immunity. Seminole Tribe. Here, the Defendant would argue that BISA is passed to stimulate the economy as stated in the preamble. Hence, BISA §2 is unconstitutional.

(4) whether state courts can apply federal immigration law?

The potential Plaintiff is the State and the Defendant is the U.S.

The Plaintiff would argue that Congress does not have the power to force states to implement regulations. N.Y. v. U.S.; Printz. Here, the Congress commandeers by requiring state courts to resolve immigration applications and apply federal laws is thus unconstitutional.

On the other hand, the Defendant would argue that “commandeer” state judiciary is valid when making state courts apply federal law over state law. Testa v. Katz. Here, a state court is required to deal with a cause of action created under federal law that provides jurisdiction in state courts and states may not discriminate against rights that arise under federal laws.

Trump v. Hawaii. Here, President Veidt's executive order banning all Bandrikans from entering the U.S.

(5) whether President Veidt can ban Bandrikans from entering the U.S.?

A presidential proclamation placing entry restrictions on foreign nationals of particular countries is sufficiently justified by national security concerns to survive a rational-basis review.

Trump v. Hawaii. Here, President Veidt's executive order banning all Bandrikans from entering the U.S.

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entering the United States could be deemed justified by national security concerns because Bandrikan immigrants threaten national security and could be seen as within the purview of his authority to address potential risks to the country.

However, this power is not absolute and is subject to judicial review. Those who challenge it could argue that no material circumstances regarding Bandrikan immigration have changed since 2022. Hence, the executive order lacks specific evidence or rationale to support the claim that all Bandrikan nationals threaten national security.

(6) whether Kovacs has the standing to sue?

The potential Plaintiff is Kovacs and the Defendant is the U.S.

The Plaintiff must first establish standing, which is the ability of a party to bring a suit to court based upon their stake in the outcome. Lujan. Three constitutional requirements to be satisfied.

Firstly, it must have an injury-in-fact and must be actual, personal and concrete.

Secondly, there is causation or traceability. Thirdly, there is redressability where the court can redress the injury. No generalized grievances because this is a constitutional requirement which covers under ‘injury-in-fact’ as expounded by Justice Scalia. Lujan. Here, the Plaintiff satisfies neither of the standing requirements. Hence, the Plaintiff does not have standing under Art. 3 to litigate a generalized grievance against the government in federal court because he suffered no personal injury other than the harm suffered by all citizens.

The court is likely to move for dismiss based on the plaintiffs’ lack of standing.

[983 words]

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QUESTION 3

Constitutional theories such as originalism and textualism argue for interpreting the

Constitution according to its original meaning or plain text, respectively. These approaches allow

for a consistent application of constitutional principles to modern issues. According to Tribe, who

agrees with Justice Scalia, we should only interpret the literal text and not put in unenacted

expectations or assumptions. With this approach, we can avoid the ‘Great divide’ between the

“original” meaning and the “current” meaning, where the former is reasonably understands the

original meaning (which is “judging”) and the latter “makes up” meaning that can best meet the

needs of a changing society (which is “lawmaking”). Tribe agrees with Ronald Dworkin and

critiques Justice Scalia that all of us are originalists because we all search for what the text

originally meant. But we err because we fail to seek what the author intended to say through the

text adopted. Hence, we should look at what they say and not what they do or do not put in expected

effects or consequences. Besides, Tribe also disagrees that we can discover through tools like

language used, history, psychology and biography. This is because it may be obvious only for

smart readers or users above the tools.

For example, some constitutional provisions are given broad interpretation because they

are capable of elaboration, and we apply morals, but some are dated, static, and concrete, and we

do not apply morals like the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Amendments. According to Tribe, both Dworkin and

Scalia err because of their insistence that they know historical facts. Moreover, recently, doctrines

like the commerce clause or the necessary and proper clause have been subject to expansive

interpretations, leading to debates over the appropriate and adequate scope of federal authority.

Since 1824, decision made in Gibbons, the Court’s understanding of Congress’s power under the

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Commerce Clause has expanded tremendously. This huge evolution was developed particularly in the New Deal era when the Court adopted a broad view of Congress’s interstate commerce powers to support many of President Roosevelt’s economic policies. For example, the Court in Wickard, held that the Commerce Clause empowered Congress to regulate intrastate activities if this sort of activity, in aggregate, affects interstate commerce. However, these instances allow too much room for judges to impose their own subjective and elitist values. Judges need neutral, objective criteria to make legitimate decisions, and becoming originalists could aid.

In short, the Constitution does not "grow" and "change". If change is needed, legislature should make it and not judges. There should be no new surprise implications because all are merely inferences that reason our “right answer to the question”.

Despite its enduring significance, the Constitution may not always be perfect for addressing all contemporary political and social conditions. Critics of originalism and textualism argue that the Constitution's language and original intent may not always offer clear guidance on modern complexities such as technological advancements, globalization, or evolving societal norms and consensus. Therefore, there is always a reason why the Constitution is written in an open-ended language – to give flexibility in governance. According to Chemerinsky, a non-Originalist’s argument, meaning can change and evolve overtime. Besides, the non-originalist approach in representation reinforcing review plays an important role when the legislature be illegitimate, such as systematically disadvantaged minorities or acting unconstitutional. The famous Footnote 4, U.S. v. Carolene Products. Also, when the societal consensus has changed. Obergefell v. Hodges.

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Non-originalism allows judges to prevent crises that could result from the strict interpretation of the Constitution that no longer serves its original purpose, and the amendment process is too difficult and cannot be relied upon to save. In Gibbons, Justice Johnson writing a separate concurrence, advocated for a broader reading of the Commerce Clause. He rejected a “strict or literal” approach to the text of the Constitution. Besides, he suggested that the Commerce Clause should be interpreted expansively to ensure “the advancement of society.” Additionally, Justice Marshall held in McCulloch that if Maryland’s strict interpretation is true, then need not have necessary and proper clause. It must add something beyond in order to achieve goals.

In short, quoting Justice Marshall in McCulloch, “We must never forget it is a constitution we are expounding” and “intended to endure for ages to come, and, consequently, to be adapted to the various crises of human affairs.” I believe he might not think or heard of originalism, but I think what he says is that it has to be a living Constitution for better people protection.

[750 words]

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