Breaking the Deadlocks: Revisiting the Intricacies of P5 Veto Powers Dynamics in the UN

Security Council

An Undergraduate Thesis Proposal

Presented to the Department of Political Science

School of Law and Governance

University of San Carlos

In Partial Fulfillment

of the Requirements for the Course

POS 3214: Research Proposal

Alburo, Christian Jaymar T.

Dajao, Julian James B.

Puso, Kelly Grace D.

BA POS-IRFS 3

May 2024

ENDORSEMENT FORM

POSC Undergraduate Program Form: Endorsement Form (by Thesis Adviser)

Date : May 3, 2024

To : Thesis Committee

Asst. Prof. Rejene T. Lakibul, MPMD (Chair)

Mr. Joeddin Niño D. Olayvar, MA PS (Member)

Mrs. Joanna Marie F. Baroman, MA PS (Member)

I Mark Philipp H. Opada, JD the designated thesis adviser of

Alburo, Christian Jaymar T.

Dajao, Julian James B.

Puso, Kelly Grace D.

for Bachelor of Arts in Political Science major in

International Relations and Foreign Services

do hereby confirm that I have done series of consultations and/or discussions with the student/s exhaustively read

her/his

paper as well as given the inputs I see fit for the improvement of the student/s thesis.

After fulfilling all the enumerated roles and responsibilities as a thesis adviser, I hereby confirm the following:

1. That the student/s-researcher/s have completed all of the pertinent inputs/comments/suggestions given

her/him through the consultation;

2. That the version of the paper herewith submitted is satisfactory in quality, both in content and form;

3. That the student/s-researcher/s can defend her/his thesis on questions of disciplinal value and research

rigor

Hence, as the thesis adviser, I hereby humbly endorse the acceptance of her/his

/ Thesis Proposal Final Thesis

Moreover, I agree to further assist the student/s-researcher/s with the comments/suggestions of the Defense Panel.

Thank you very much for this opportunity.

Name and Signature

of Adviser: Atty. Mark Philipp H. Opada, JD Date May 2, 2024

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or misuse of official school records, documents or credentials, or any other acts indicating fraud

or misrepresentation.

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Name

Alburo, Christian Jaymar T.

Dajao, Julian James B.

Puso, Kelly Grace D.

Program Bachelor of Arts in Political Science major in

Course POS 3214: Research Proposal

Title of Thesis XXX

I, the undersigned, confirm that I understood the University policy about plagiarism

and the importance of intellectual honesty.

Signature of Student

Date of Submission May 3, 2024

Name

Alburo, Christian Jaymar T.

Dajao, Julian James B.

Puso, Kelly Grace D.

Program Bachelor of Arts in Political Science major in

Course POS 3214: Research Proposal

Title of Thesis XXX

I testify that the work I submitted is wholly my own, and that any quotations or section

of text taken from the published or unpublished work of any other person is duly and

fully acknowledged therein.

Signature of Student

Date of Submission May 3, 2024

Student Receipt

~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~

Name of Student

Alburo, Christian Jaymar T.

Dajao, Julian James B.

Puso, Kelly Grace D.

Title of Course POS 3214: Research Proposal

Date Received

Received by (N&S)

Recorded By: _______________________________

Irish L. Managbanag

Date

Signed

STUDENT’S DECLARATION OF ORIGINALITY

I,

Alburo, Christian Jaymar T.

Dajao, Julian James B.

Puso, Kelly Grace D.

, here submits my thesis paper entitled,

XXXX

and truthfully declare that the paper is a product of my original research investigation. To the best of my knowledge and belief, it

contains no material previously published or written by another person nor does it include contents that are falsified or fabricated. I

also sought permission from the copyright owner to use text, illustrations, and/or framework substantively used in the paper. I

understand that should the University of San Carlos represented by its Administrators and Faculty eventually discover that my

attestations herein are not so, I accept the right of the University to impose the appropriate sanctions including the non-granting of

the degree, if so warranted.

Signed

Alburo, Christian Jaymar T.

Dajao, Julian James B.

Puso, Kelly Grace D.

at the University of San Carlos, Cebu City, Philippines.

Name and

Signature of

Student:

Alburo, Christian Jaymar T.

Dajao, Julian James B.

Date

Signed May 3, 2024

Puso, Kelly Grace D.

APPROVAL SHEET

The research proposal entitled “XXXXX” submitted by XXX in partial fulfillment of the

requirements for the degree of BACHELOR OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE (BA POS)

major in XXX has been reviewed by the Panel of Examiners and is recommended for acceptance

and approval.

Approved by the Thesis Evaluation Committee with a rating of .

Asst. Prof. Rejene T. Lakibul, MPMD

Panel Chair

Mr. Joeddin Niño D. Olayvar, MA PS Mrs. Joanna Marie F. Baroman, MA PS

Panel Member Panel Member

Atty. Mark Philipp H. Opada, JD

Panel Member

Accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

BACHELOR OF ARTS IN POLITICAL SCIENCE MAJOR IN XXX

ALAINE T. LIGGAYU, DPA

Chairperson, Department of Political Science

ATTY. JOSE GLENN C. CAPANAS

Dean, School of Law and Governance

ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

We would like to express our gratitude to our research teacher Mr. Rejene T. Lakibul for

providing us with knowledge as a research adviser and guiding us throughout our journey in

creating our research. The critique and clarification he provided us genuinely aided in

completing our intricate study. This research would not have been possible without his help.

We would like to thank our thesis adviser Atty. Mark Philip H. Opada for steering the direction

of our paper and assisting us in finding information and knowledge on the chosen topic. His

expertise truly contributed to improving our research

And most importantly to our God almighty, for His grace and blessings that enabled us to finish

this research.

ABSTRACT

This study aims to analyze the veto powers of the Permanent-5 members of the UN Security

Council and their ability to be responsive to modern day international pressures and its

implications to global governance in the international realm. By using the data gathered from the

UNSC vetoed resolutions, the researchers explore the given assumptions through a document

analysis via a mixed-method research design in an exploratory approach, identifying the nuances

of the P5 members of the UN Security Council in maintaining a peaceful and secure international

arena.

Keywords: Veto Power, UN Security Council, resolutions, global governance, legitimacy

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This research analyzes the responsiveness of the veto powers bestowed to the Permanent

5 member of the UN Security Council and their implications on global governance in the

international realm as the general objective and proceeds to its specific objectives: First, to assess

the legal framework of the UN Security Council that is designed to reach a deadlock, to explore

the practices and norms within the council and the dynamics of the member states, to evaluate

the impact of the veto powers and its effectiveness, legitimacy, and responsiveness to global

pressures, and lastly, to identify possible avenues for a council reform.

The research is also grounded in the following assumptions:

1. Political stability and avoidance of unilateral actions are the reasons for the creation of

the veto powers

2. The Security Council is designed to prevent irrational decisions when dealing with

inter-state concerns

3. The veto is a practice that is in violation of any principle of governance

The limitations of this research is that it is exclusively an in-depth analysis of the veto

powers of the Permanent 5 member of the UN Security Council through the vetoed resolution

documents provided by the online Dag Hammarskjöld Library (DHL) of the UN, an information

center for delegates and UN officials as well as researchers and others with an interest in UN

matters.

With the full depth of the literature review, it provides major contexts as to what this

study is about and how the veto power of the Permanent 5 members of the UNSC work.

Furthermore, the existing literature suggests that the original purpose of the veto powers have

been disregarded by the members with permanency which in turn, have lessened the efficacy and

legitimacy of the Security Council in creating resolution, to promote a peaceful and secure

international arena. This study aim to analyze the nuances of the Security Council in using the

veto powers, especially when substantial resolutions are rejected.

The study is anchored on the Veto Players Theory by George Tsebelis (2002) and the

Three Faces of Power by Steven Lukes (2005). The Veto Players Theory is used to identify the

dynamic process of the security council when faced with a pressing issue, while the Three Faces

of Power is used to analyze the nuances of the P5 members in deciding whether to veto a

resolution or not. It is also used to explain why and how the veto power is able to cause more

harm than good in modern day issues. With the help of the both frameworks, this study will

present an extensive analysis of the veto powers of the Permanent 5 members of the UN Security

Council’s ability to provide a resolution to issues presented to the council, evaluate the

legitimacy of the UN Security Council, and assess possible avenues for a reform of the veto

power structure of the security council.

This study is a mixed method research. The research of this study is exploratory in

nature. This study will dive into the power dynamics of the UN Security Council and their

decision-making. The study will then explore the frequency of the Permanent 5 members' usage

of the veto power and the “deadlocks” they reach when drafting a resolution. Furthermore, the

quantitative data analysis of the study provides statistics on the frequency of each permanent

member to veto a drafted resolution.

This study uses the legal documents available from the Dag Hammarskjöld Library to

determine the power dynamics of the UN Security Council and their decision-making process

that affects their legitimacy as an organization striving to achieve peace in the international

arena.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I.......................................................................................................................................16

INTRODUCTION................................................................................................................... 16

Rationale of the Study........................................................................................................16

THE PROBLEM......................................................................................................................20

Statement of the Problem...................................................................................................20

Statement of Assumptions................................................................................................. 21

Statement of Hypothesis.................................................................................................... 22

Significance of the Study................................................................................................... 22

Scope and Limitation of the Study.....................................................................................25

DEFINITION OF TERMS...................................................................................................... 26

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY...................................................................................... 27

Chapter II..................................................................................................................................... 27

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND.........................................................................................28

Review of Related Literature............................................................................................. 28

Theoretical Framework......................................................................................................48

Conceptual Framework......................................................................................................50

Chapter III....................................................................................................................................51

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY.............................................................................................51

Research Environment............................................................................................................. 51

Research Design.......................................................................................................................52

Research Instruments............................................................................................................... 54

Research Procedures................................................................................................................ 54

Ethical Considerations............................................................................................................. 55

BIBLIOGRAPHY........................................................................................................................ 56

APPENDIX A............................................................................................................................... 63

Research Instrument.................................................................................................................63

APPENDIX B............................................................................................................................... 82

Thesis Adviser Consultations.................................................................................................. 82

Chapter I

INTRODUCTION

Rationale of the Study

“If the conscience of humanity… cannot find in the United Nations its greatest tribune,

there is a grave danger that it will look elsewhere for peace and justice” (ICISS, 2001). The

United Nations Security Council (UNSC) is a principle institutional architecture within the

broader landscape of international humanitarian law, which is so frequently disregarded, so

selectively applied, continually abused, and so ineffectively enforced that the very idea of

"humanitarian law" itself has collapsed as a consequence. The UNSC is the principal

international organization authorized to enforce binding obligations to the 193 UN member states

to promote a peaceful and secure world. Being the sole recognized body that can authorize

humanitarian intervention, the decisions made by the UNSC carry thousands of lives at stake.

In its origins, the Security Council was created as one of the principal organs of the UN

under the charter signed in 1945 intending to fix the flaws that had rendered ineffective to its

predecessor body, the Council of the League of Nations. The Security Council, outlined in the

Charter, possesses distinctive powers setting it apart from other intergovernmental bodies.

Firstly, it has the authority to make legally binding decisions for member states, as stated in

Article 25 of the Charter. This includes all decisions the council adopts, not solely those under

Chapter VII. Secondly, the Council holds the unique power, detailed in Chapter VII, to enforce

its decisions through sanctions, embargoes (Article 41), and military force (Article 42). The veto

powers of the P5 members create a limitation on the decision-making of the UNSC which is

faced with concerns about the council's legitimacy and effectiveness in doing its duty.

Following World War II, the United Nations emerged intending to facilitate international

collaboration and accord. Smaller and less secure states found this appealing, but convincing the

‘great powers’, who already held advantageous positions in the unregulated realm of the

international arena, required more effort. Consequently, this was short-lived, for the greater

nations perceived the United Nations as a relinquishing of dominance and influence. The

Security Council's composition has been divisive as critics claim that the five permanent

members render the global power structure that prevailed after World War II when colonial

powers ruled the majority of the world. The P5 was able to unilaterally grind out their work,

thereby marginalizing entire regions and continents and giving the conquerors of World War II a

disproportionate role in maintaining international peace and security. There is a compelling need

to revisit the veto powers held by the P5 driven by mounting concerns, as member states

including those from the developing world, argue that the framework of the Security Council

does not accurately represent the geopolitical landscape today and risks its efficacy in addressing

global current challenges. The body’s composition remains unchanged after the membership was

increased from six to ten members in 1965, and in 1971 the People's Republic of China occupied

the Republic of China (Taiwan)'s permanent seat. By assigning permanent seats on the Security

Council and bestowing the exclusive power to veto any resolution with a single vote, they

ensured a method to uphold unequal international influence and safeguard their respective

national interests (Tsagourias, 2013). Despite their statutory privilege, P5 members' influence

extends beyond vetoing to agenda setting, norm entrepreneurship, and strategic resolution

crafting. This poses a challenge to the Security Council's capacity to adequately tackle major

international crises and conflicts. Instances such as the recurring conflict between Israel and

Palestinian group Hamas, Russia’s annexation of Crime followed by its invasion of Ukraine, and

even the COVID-19 Pandemic illustrate the Council's struggles. These conflicts often reveal a

clash of interests among member states, hindering the Council's ability to take decisive action.

This escalates some, if not all, mass atrocities and human suffering stemming greatly from the P5

members' impunity and lack of accountability. As a result, the necessity for restructuring the

Security Council of the United Nations is more pressing than ever.

Regarding the humanitarian situation in Syria, the UN secretary-general stated in 2016

that "the organization stands as the foundation of multilateralism and has played a role in

maintaining decades of relative peace, yet the current challenges exceed its capacity to address"

(Guterres, 2016). A formal revision to the composition of the UNSC has been pushed for by the

Biden administration, Antonio Guterres, the UN Secretary-General, and advocates from the

Global South. Some of the suggestions that have been put out range from increasing the number

of permanent members to finding out how to strip away the P5's veto power. Looking back at the

evolution of the UNSC throughout time shows that its only formal reform resulted in a genuine

change in the organization's operations and procedures rather than a reduction in the P5's

inherent statutory powers - particularly the UNSC’s rotating 10 elected member states.

Transpired in 1963, the P5 made minimal concessions by consenting to enlarge the cohort of

non-permanent members in response to pressure from the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), yet

retained their authoritative control without relinquishing any power. These changes empowered

other members to take up new tasks, modify the dynamics of the chamber, alter the resources

available to diplomats attempting to work through P5's differences and contribute to a package of

concepts aimed at advancing multilateral action on pressing issues in the face of P5 obstruction.

These minimal adjustments appear relatively minor and inadequate in addressing the

fundamental issues and the internal divisions within the UNSC but are also outdated.

Nonetheless, major reform remains less unlikely than ever because it will seek to limit

the P5's existing powers while requiring concurrence from the P5 itself before it can be enacted.

The most important to note is that Over the years, numerous reform agendas have already been

tried in an effort to enable a more definitive, substantial, and morally connected organization.

Still, one realization is brought into light for the most part, that all reforms have failed and

brought little to no change. Amidst the age of fleeting multilateralism, Attempts to amend the

UN Charter are more inclined to dismantle existing frameworks of multilateral collaboration

rather than establish a fairer institution, despite some invoking Article 109 of the formal method

for rewriting the Charter via general conference. The demands of the suffering and the vulnerable

are inadequately taken into consideration by the UN’s institutional design at the cost of

balance-of-power considerations. Accordingly, this research endeavors to analyze how the veto

powers held by the P5 members of the UNSC affect the broader landscape of global governance,

including their impact on international law, the pursuit of justice, human rights, and norms. The

group recognizes a knowledge gap about the effects of veto powers in the international arena, as

well as how they affect the legitimacy of the UN Security Council in particular. This study aims

to critically examine the impact of the P5 members' veto power on global governance in the

international sphere, focusing on understanding the legal framework that governs their use as

well as examining the formal and informal customs and standards that exist within the council,

taking into account the role and influence of both permanent and non-permanent members.

THE PROBLEM

Statement of the Problem

The UN Security Council wields tremendous authority and influence as an international body

that works with other international entities to address disputes and promote peace on a global

scale. The notion of humanitarian legitimacy bestows an excessive degree of control and

influence upon a solitary, unrepresentative organization, particularly upon the P5 members due to

their veto power. These objectives form the foundation of this study:

General Objective: To analyze if the Permanent Five Members of the UNSC's veto power still

respond to modern world challenges and their effects on global governance in the international

sphere.

Specific Objectives:

a. To analyze the legal framework governing the exercise of veto rights by the Permanent

Five members in the event of a deadlock, including pertinent UN Charter articles and

related treaties.

b. To investigate formal and informal council practices and norms, such as power relations

and the allocation of influence.

c. To assess how the veto powers affect the UNSC's responsiveness, legitimacy, and

efficacy in tackling today's pressing international security issues.

d. To determine possible paths toward UNSC reform in order to lessen the negative impacts

of the Permanent 5 members using their veto power.

Statement of Assumptions

The analysis of the veto powers held by the P5 members of the United Nations Security

Council (UNSC) is grounded on several key assumptions:

1. The Veto Power was established to protect political stability and prevent unilateral

measures by any member state from escalating tensions.

2. The UN Security Council is a regulatory system aimed at preventing irrational decisions

in interstate relations.

3. The Veto Power can prohibit substantive decisions drafted by the United Nations Security

Council.

4. The veto itself is viewed by many as eroding the organization's democratic legitimacy,

which is against any just governance convention.

5. The UNSC's procedures and dynamics are shaped by a combination of formal official

procedures, informal practices, and conventions, as widely acknowledged.

6. The UNSC is hesitant to reform, as seen by the multiple barriers encountered during prior

attempts to reform it—most notably the P5 members' veto powers

7. The P5's use of their veto power is thought to have wider implications for global

governance, thereby jeopardizing the credibility and efficiency of the UN Security

Council in resolving international peace and security matters.

Statement of Hypothesis

H1: The UNSC's imbalances of power are maintained in part by the veto powers of the P5.

H2: The effectiveness of the council's ability to address urgent issues including conflict

resolution, peacekeeping missions, and the prevention of war crimes is correlated with the P5's

use of veto power.

H3: The veto privileges of the P5 have a significant impact on the council's decision-making

process, as well as the system's humanitarian validity.

H4: The efficacy of the Veto Powers in addressing contemporary issues has declined compared

to its historical capacity at the time of its inception.

Significance of the Study

The history of veto power spans several historical eras and civilizations, with significant

advancements occurring in medieval Poland-Lithuania, ancient Rome, and modern-day Europe.

Contemporary veto power evolved from European royal institutions, where kings could withhold

royal consent for measures.. Following the French Revolution, disputes over the royal veto

resulted in its modification and eventual removal, whereas in republican systems such as the

United States, the presidential veto evolved as a mechanism to limit legislative power, albeit to

various degrees.

Veto powers extend beyond domestic governance to international bodies such as the

United Nations Security Council, where permanent members exercise complete veto power over

decisions. While some vetoes can be overruled using processes such as supermajority votes,

some are absolute and cannot be overturned. This suggests that the influence of veto powers on

governance dynamics is significant and that the presence of veto players continues to be a crucial

factor in political decision-making even in systems without established veto powers (U.S. Const.

art. I, § 7.). Highlighting how veto power can be used by the executive to affect policy outcomes,

shape decision-making processes, and shift the balance of power across branches of government.

All member states of the United Nations are part of its General Assembly (GA). The GA

can pass resolutions on relevant issues. It only requires the majority of votes (more than half of

the members) for a resolution to pass. However, the UN Security Council is much more

exclusive than the rest of the GA, consisting of the P5 members France, the United Kingdom, the

United States, China, and Russia, who are given the power to veto any resolution. Apart from

them, 10 additional “non-permanent” members are elected every two years, each based on the

UNGA elections; They have no veto power vested in them, unlike the P5 members. The Veto

Power originates from Article 27 of the UN Charter, though not explicitly mentioned. Chapter VI

and Article 52 of the UN Charter also include non-binding recommendations, which give the P5

members absolute veto over all binding UN sanctions, peacekeeping operations, etc. Similarly,

for every government system, the veto power is a tool vested in the executive branch (such as in

the Philippines) to prevent any drafted bill from being passed and becoming law. Such instances

can be seen in the Philippines where if the President does not approve of a bill, they can veto it,

which would be considered a legislative act (COA), similarly in the United States, this is an

illustration of the separation of powers integral to the US Constitution, creating a system of

“checks and balances” between the branches of the government and gives additional protection

to prevent “unwise” proposals to be passed (McCarty & Poole, 1995). However, the UNSC’s P5

member’s right to veto is quite anomalous in as much as there is no executive in the UNSC. A

question then gets raised, are the P5 members by default the executives of the organization?

According to Stewart Patrick (2023), there is no other UN Charter provision that is more

resented than the veto power itself; It could be discouraged, but not eliminated. The use of veto

powers has, over time, strayed away from its original purpose. It has become an alarming case

considering the fact that the veto powers are now being used as a way to protect a state's national

interests, while also disregarding the negative implications it has on the international arena. It is

critical to investigate how the veto powers granted to the permanent members of the UN Security

Council affect the legitimacy of the Council and its consequences for global governance. This

research will contribute to the body of knowledge on the veto powers of the UN Security

Council's five permanent members, as well as investigate the implications of their use.. The

following sectors of the group of people are the potential beneficiaries of the study:

Academic Institutions and researchers. The data that the researchers have collected and

analyzed could be used as a tool to expand knowledge on the topic of veto powers. This study

may also serve as a reference for future researchers who would be interested in the topic.

Policy Makers and government officials. The study on the veto powers could be a

gateway for policymakers to further alleviate their decision-making and better strategize for a

more effective diplomatic relationship and negotiations. The study can also help navigate the

political maze and intricacies created by the power imbalance of the UNSC

Think tanks. This study could serve as a contribution to the knowledge of global politics

that succeeds in realigning goals and strategies concerning political tools such as veto powers,

and further strengthen their advocacy efforts.

Students. This study will lay out all necessary information about the veto powers from

who has the power to veto up to analyzing the effects of the usage of the power, and continuing

issues surrounding the use of this power. The study could serve as a learning resource for those

interested in studying diplomacy, international relations, and global governance.

Scope and Limitation of the Study

This study provides a comprehensive analysis of the exercise of the veto powers of the

permanent members of the UNSC, particularly the United States, China, France, Russia, and the

United Kingdom. This research relies primarily on an in-depth analysis of the UNSC resolution

documents, which is mostly gathered from online platforms, and could set the bounds for the

extensiveness of the study. A mixed-method design is used to offer a level of subjectivity, as well

as capture the dynamics of the veto use of the P5 members. The study is limited to the use of

veto powers and does not include other aspects of the decision-making process within the UNSC.

It heavily relies on online data and under the assumption that the use of veto power directly

influences global peace, and may strip down the complexities of international relations.

DEFINITION OF TERMS

International Arena - The global stage or platform where international relations, diplomacy,

and conflicts take place among states and other key actors

International Law - A body of norms and principles that regulate how governments and other

international entities interact with one another.

P-5 Member (Permanent 5 Member) - The sovereign states granted permanent seats on the

United Nations Security Council under the UN Charter of 1945 who hold significant influence

over the council’s decisions

Reform - The process of making adjustments or alterations to social, political, and economic

institutions or practices within the United Nations Security Council framework, often aimed at

enhancing its effectiveness or addressing existing challenges

Sovereignty - The supreme authority possessed by states within the international sphere, which

encompasses independence, autonomy, and the right to self-governance without external

interference

UNSC (United Nations Security Council) - One of the six main UN bodies in charge of

maintaining world peace and security. The organization plays a crucial role in global governance

by making recommendations to the General Assembly and overseeing adherence to the UN

Charter

UNSC Resolutions - A formal expression of the collective opinion or decisions of the United

Nations Security Council, which carry significant weight in international law and diplomacy

Veto Power - In the context of p5, the power granted to the permanent members of the UN

Security Council to veto or reject proposed resolutions or decisions. In the domestic context,

refers to the constitutional right to reject a decision or proposal made by a law-making body.

ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

This Research proposal consists of three (3) chapters:

Chapter 1 presents an introduction of the study which includes a rationale, a background

of the study, the general and specific objectives of the study, the scopes and limitations of the

study, and the definition of terms used by the researchers. Chapter 2 presents previous studies

conducted which are related to the topic along with a literature review to give footing to our

study. It also highlights the theories that the study is grounded on and the conceptual framework

to show the relationship between the variables. Finally, Chapter 3 discusses the methodologies

used in the study, the method for gathering of data, and ethical considerations of the study.

Chapter II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

Review of Related Literature

In this chapter, the researchers reviewed significant literature, articles, journals, and

theoretical researchers to aid and contextualize their research topic. These serve as the

groundwork for Analyzing the Veto Powers of the Permanent 5 Members of the UN Security

Council and their Implications on Global Governance and International Relations. Furthermore,

the reviewed literature adds value to the insights of this research topic. Lastly, the researchers

gathered this related literature to fully grasp the concept of the study.

Veto Powers History

Veto power, albeit not present in all codified political systems, is a vital aspect of political

systems that provide authorities with the legal right to unilaterally block official actions. Veto

powers are inherently embedded in the dynamics of governance across different political systems

as tools for balancing competing interests, maintaining stability, and limiting power

concentration (Tsebelis, 2002). In modern political systems, veto powers typically reside in

constitutions and can be exercised by various branches or levels of government. This then takes

on different forms: certain systems assign explicit veto power to certain individuals or bodies,

while other systems extend power among multiple actors who wield de facto veto power through

informal means.

Today's veto power seems particularly made to be a power to prevent the passing of

drafted bills, as purely as the authority to create them. The fact that laws include the legislating

body's prerogative to approve or disapprove the proposals they consider provides an explicit

explanation for this phenomenon. It is both an advantageous (positive) function and a function

that could hinder (negative) progress, with the latter function being in its nature to be able to veto

or reject. The same German political forefathers' authority oversaw both legislative

responsibilities. The US has had two authorities interested in creating laws since the time of the

Teutonic tribes: the Congress, which was the first and has the power to approve or reject

proposed laws, and the President, who is independent of the Congress but has the sole authority

to reject them, which is comparable to the Congress's negative power. These changes have been

gradual.

The reelection motive has been applied in precisely the same way when studying the

president's role in distributive politics: the president will aim to maximize the net benefits going

to his electoral district. The president is usually seen as a counterbalance to the distributive

politics of the legislature because his electoral district encompasses the entire country. It is

presumed that the president maximizes the welfare of his entire constituency by using his veto

authority (or delegated proposal powers) (Carter and Schap 1987; Dearden and Husted 1990).

According to Nolan McCarty, the executive veto and other similar mechanisms are intended to

counteract the tendency of a legislature that favors giving excessively specific benefits to its

members at the price of broader interests. There are compelling normative arguments in this

literature supporting the expansion of executive power in the legislative process, all based on the

premise of presidential universalism. The line-item veto and other measures that transfer

financial decision-making from the legislative to the executive branches are among these

suggestions

UN Security Council reform proposals

There are a lot of calls for change at the United Nations Security Council (UNSC or

Council). The role and composition of the council have also been voiced as a concern by the

heads of state members of the UNSC. There has been criticism of the Security Council for its

lack of action during the recent Syrian crisis, sparking the debate about the mission of the

Council of promoting and establishing a peaceful and secure international society. In 2004, the

U.N. In a report, Secretary-General Kofi Annan urged the UNSC to undergo extensive change so

that it would no longer serve the interests of the World War II (WWII) winners but rather the

interests of all governments and people worldwide. Before him, similar arguments were made by

former Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1995: "We are, indeed, well aware, today,

that as a result of the sudden acceleration in the pace of change, a certain number of principles

which, in the past, were the foundation for international society have become outdated or

obsolete." Considering that the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) increased the

membership of the Council from 11 to 15 in 1963—the last major reform to the UNSC—there is

a growing consensus at the U.N. that change is well overdue.

According to Dorosh & Ivasechko (2018), in 2014, Russia's military aggression toward

Ukraine, exemplified by the annexation of the Crimean Peninsula, posed a significant issue to the

security of the international arena and the existing world order. The United Nations (UN), as the

foremost international organization for global security, found itself helpless in preventing

21st-century territorial developments in Europe. This situation has once again brought up the

motion of restructuring the UN Security Council (UNSC), a crucial entity within the

organization. The need for UNSC reform is particularly crucial for Ukraine and the global

system at large. In this paper, the authors argue that the UNSC reform issue has not been

adequately considered in light of the armed conflict in the east of Ukraine and the additional

threats it poses to the international security framework. There is a lack of research on the impact

of the UNSC and its inactivity in intervening with armed conflict and the importance of reform

within the council. As a result, the aforementioned facts have sparked discussions about the UN

Security Council's reform issues, which will aid in determining the causes of the organization's

failure to resolve the conflict in Eastern Ukraine (which began in 2014) and in formulating a plan

for their abolition.

According to Blum (2005), among all the recommendations put forth by the panel, the

motion regarding the expansion of the Security Council has naturally piqued the most interest.

Broad concerns about the responsibilities and roles of the primary players in international

relations in maintaining global peace and security are what drive this interest. The paper states

that to address the demands of the public, the Security Council must be more credible, and

legitimate, and must have representation. There is a need for an increase of participation in the

decision-making of the council to those with great influence in terms of military, diplomatically,

and financially. The paper endeavors to achieve equilibrium between two primary factors that, in

its opinion, ought to dictate the Council's composition: the financial, military, and diplomatic

contributions made to the Organization, and the general "representativeness" of the members.

These two factors could not always coincide or even come into conflict with one another. On the

other hand, some states may possess the necessary military might without significantly

contributing financially to the UN, while other states may contribute significantly financially but

lack the necessary military clout. Furthermore, assuming that "representativeness" also refers to

the population size of the state, some Organization's representative members are, specifically,

those with the greatest populations, and are away from being part of the major financial

contributors.

In 2003, former Secretary-General Kofi Annan suggested a reform during the General

Assembly (A/58/PV.7) In his words (verbatim): “I respectfully suggest to you, Excellencies, that

in the eyes of your peoples, the difficulty of reaching an agreement does not excuse your failure

to do so. If you want the Council’s decisions to command greater respect, particularly in the

developing world, you need to address the issue of its composition with greater urgency.” There

was then a request given to the international representatives to analyze and assess the possible

hazards that the current council imposes to peace and security, the approaches that existed, the

instruments utilized, and their mechanism, which included a call for a Security Council reform.

In 2004, the panel released a report “A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility”

(A/59/565), which composes over 101 reform recommendations of the Security Council. It

proposed models A and B for enlargement, both of which suggested expanding the Security

Council to 24 members. Model A proposed adding six (6) new permanent members without the

inclusion of a veto power, and a two-year term seat to be elected for three states. Meanwhile,

model B suggested a new category of eight seats which were to be reelected every four years and

a new two-year seat that is non-renewable.

The UN Security Council is an organization with the authority to bind member states to

resolutions to uphold a peaceful and secure global order, in desperate times, and to approve the

use of force. It is among the most important multilateral organizations that hope to influence

world politics. Although the winners of World War II founded the UNSC, its makeup now seems

even more antiquated given the altering global power dynamics. Although the UNSC has

certainly been the target of the most reform-related appeals, altering the organization's

institutional structure and decision-making procedures has shown to be one of the most difficult

challenges of the previous several decades. Even so, there have been modifications to many of

the main participants in the contemporary international system that appear to be denied equitable

treatment in the UNSC's fundamental patterns of decision-making, notwithstanding the informal

ways in which external actors are brought into the body's production and activities. Several

nations, including developing African republics like Nigeria and South Africa, as well as Brazil,

Germany, India, and Japan, are keen to gain permanent participation in the Council. China and

Russia, both of which are part of BRICS while also given permanency, have been considered

“insiders” for a considerable amount of time, in contrast to their roles in other multilateral

institutions. This makes the UNSC's position distinct from other international organizations,

where Western nations have typically controlled the agenda (Hosli & Dörfler, 2015).

While the Security Council is currently considered the primary body tasked with

preserving a peaceful and secure international arena, this was not the only proposal when the

United Nations was established. In June 1945, several suggestions were made, including one that

would have required the General Assembly to recommend ratification for all decisions made by

the Security Council during the United Nations Conference on International Organization.

However, this recommendation was deemed too burdensome and potentially hindered the

Council's ability to take decisive action. Ultimately, the General Assembly's request for a

significant role in Security Council procedures was denied, as the GA already influences the

Security Council by electing the majority of its members (Gruenberg, 2009).

Usage of veto powers during humanitarian crisis

The UN Security Council's position on how to handle Syria's Arab Spring issue is

incredibly divided. The Syrian government has suppressed protests since the uprising started in

March 2011 by using excessive violence against citizens and civilian areas. There has been a

protracted impasse in the Council regarding the increasing violence. For the first five months of

the crisis, the Security Council was not able to reach a consensus on the issuance of a

non-binding Presidential Statement due to differences in interpretation of the Syrian situation.

Two resolutions on the contentious topics of sanctions and regime change have been vetoed as a

result of subsequent disagreements on what steps should be taken to address the violence. Russia

and China both opposed the measures in October 2011 and February 2012. In a rare show of

agreement on this matter, the Security Council allowed for the deployment of a group of UN

military spectators in Syria more than a year into the war. However, the high levels of violence

against UN observers led to the swift suspension of this lowest-common-denominator reaction.

The amount of violence against Syrian citizens increased during the impasse in the Security

Council (Gifkins, 2012).

In Trahan (2020), the issue of whether or not the UNSC’s veto power can be used in

cases of humanitarian crises and war crimes—which are jus cogens standards that are accorded

the greatest level of protection—is examined. As members given permanency of the UNSC are

also states, the author contends that they must uphold jus cogens standards, just as states are

required to. Permanent members may be violating their commitments to preserve these essential

principles of international law by vetoing measures that could stop or address such serious

crimes. In the context of significant international crime, Trahan's research raises significant

moral and legal concerns regarding the exercise of the veto authority (pp. 93–94).

Melling and Dennett (2018) provide examples of veto usage by permanent members (P5)

in their critical analysis of veto power in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC). They

note that on February 28, 2017, the imposition of sanctions against parties using chemical

weapons in Syria during its civil war (334) was a draft resolution proposed by France and Spain

that Russia has vetoed. Russia was joined by China in vetoing a similar draft resolution on May

22, 2014 (334), which condemned human rights violations and international humanitarian law

breaches by the Syrian authorities, pro-government militias, and non-state armed groups. These

examples illustrate the significant role that P5 veto power plays in shaping UNSC

decision-making processes regarding international peacekeeping efforts (p. 286).

Papalia (2017) highlights that the veto powers allow P-5 members to protect their own,

and their allies’, interests, even if it invalidates the duty of the UN Security Council to promote a

peaceful and secure international arena. An example would be Israel being shielded by UN

condemnation and economic sanctions multiple times because of the USA threatening to use or

the usage of the veto in favor of Israel. They have been active in preventing any resolution

condemning Israeli activities in East Jerusalem and denouncing the construction of the

Palestinian wall. Apart from that, the veto power allows the members with permanency to avoid

scrutiny from the International Criminal Court (ICC) when there is a situation that arises in their

own or their allied state’s territories. An example of this would be when the USA was able to

gain immunity from an ICC prosecution when they threatened to use the veto power, which

made them able to operate outside the legal framework alluded to in a resolution.

The gravity of crimes that are acknowledged as coming within universal jurisdiction,

such as crimes against humanity, war crimes, and genocide, is highlighted by Wenaweser and

Alavi (2020). They point out that, in accordance with international treaties like the 1948

Genocide Convention and customary international law, all states bear an obligation to prevent

and punish these crimes. Because the UNSC has broad authority to decide on appropriate actions

to restore global peace and security, which can help prevent or end these crimes and lessen the

associated human suffering, permanent members of the UNSC in particular have an increased

responsibility. This emphasizes how crucial the UNSC's actions are in tackling these grave

international crimes.

Motives of the permanent members for using the veto power

In a journal article by Weldes (1996), he states that there are two reasons as to why

national interests are important in international politics. First, policy-makers grasp the goals

needed by a state's foreign policy through their national interests. Second, legitimacy and

political support for state action are also generated and determined through their national interest,

by making it function as a “rhetorical device.” National interest thus creates power which helps

establish it as an important factor, and to regulate the actions taken by states.

Iyase & Folarin (2018) suggest that the self-interests of major world powers have

significantly contributed to the widespread conflicts in the global community. The veto power

system's influence has often triggered, escalated, and prolonged conflicts, indicating a

concerning trend of power corruption. This has led to a degradation of the international political

system (p. 106).

The veto power granted to the 5 permanent members of the United Nations has been

controversial since its initiation, particularly during the formative stages of the organization. The

primary argument was whether or not the veto power should be or shouldn’t be among the great

powers, but rather on the extent of its scope. The British and American position themselves

toward limiting the veto to permanent member disputes only while the Soviet Union proposes an

unrestricted veto. This highlights the dilemma between power and principle which is still evident

in today's UN Security Council. States that are on the smaller scale objected to the granting of

the permanent members a privileged status in the council but the superpowers resisted any

opposition to their privileged position, making it an absolute condition for their participation in

the organization (Mahmood, 2013).

A critical view on the development of the veto power in the UNSC is offered by

Temelkovska and Tosheva (2019). They point out that from the UNSC's founding, every

permanent member has exercised its veto authority in accordance with their national aspirations

and interests. They do point out, though, that the veto's original intent of stopping the UN from

taking direct action against its founding members has given way to serving allies' and one's own

interests over time. Concerns have been voiced concerning how this change in veto usage may

affect the UNSC's credibility and efficacy in resolving international peace and security issues.

The authors' work clarifies the veto's changing dynamics.

In a study by Granja (2017), it is stated that the power to veto was debated on whether or

not to give the power to do so to the permanent members, who are also the founding members.

This would allow any of the 5 states given permanency to negate any resolution drafted by the

council. The veto is a mechanism originally created to assure the cooperation of the 5 permanent

members because the victors of WWII comprised the founder of the United Nations, who wanted

the power to protect their national interests, their allies, or proxies. Any policy or resolution that

was considered a hindrance to the 5 permanent members was one of the reasons why the veto

power existed for the 5 permanent members to reject it. To prevent one another from getting the

upper hand and to shield their friends from undesirable council decisions, the Soviet Union and

the United States used the veto throughout these times. Thus, the Cold War demonstrated how

the veto power can be used to obstruct resolutions and cause the Security Council to stand still.

UNSC’s legitimacy in addressing issues

On page 9 of their publication, Woutters and Ruys (2005) acknowledge that objective

analysis of veto usage in the United Nations Security Council is hindered by two factors. Firstly,

states often fail to provide clear motives for casting a veto, making it challenging to discern their

true intentions. Secondly, permanent members frequently utilize a hidden veto during

closed-door informal consultations, where they threaten to veto a measure or statement if it is put

to a vote. It is challenging to assess the impact of the Security Council since it is in its nature to

be confidential.

The Security Council hasn’t been effective in promoting a peaceful international arena (Du et al.,

2019). The basis of the claim is grounded on the council’s inefficacy in addressing the issues in

Rwanda, Ethiopia, etc. It is also noted that when the council is in the process of drafting a

resolution, there is a big setback due to the veto powers of the P5 members, which they use to

prioritize their national interests. Sanctions against states suspected of violating international law

are then able to go unpunished because of the veto power usage of the members with

permanency.

According to Trivedi (2021), the responsibility to foster a peaceful and secure

international community is bestowed upon the discretion of the UN Security Council. The veto

powers of the members with permanency is a hindrance to such a goal of promoting a peaceful

and secure international community. Instead of advancing global peace and security, the P5

members' exclusive veto power has been abused to further their national agendas. In the current

environment of international relations, Trivedi's analysis emphasizes the necessity of

reexamining the veto power and its ramifications (p. 4).

Morris and Wheeler (2007) argue that there are 2 contrasting viewpoints on the UNSC’s

legitimacy, first is its inability to control the use of force by great powers, particularly the United

States, which undermines the credibility of the UNSC in promoting a peaceful international

arena. This legitimacy crisis was opposed by the advocates of neoconservatism forces during the

George W. Bush administration. They highlighted the lack of action by the UN security system

in addressing global security challenges.

Realists believe that inequity will always exist when 193 States unite because some states

will naturally have more power than others. While this may be true, the influence of the Five

permanent members in the UN exacerbates power politics. Providing these states with

disproportionate authority can lead to arbitrary decision-making. Permanent members are often

perceived as being above the law. In the global society, member nations may make decisions, but

the sociological basis for the Security Council's power to make these decisions can be threatened.

This extends to normative legitimacy. If the core principle of sovereign equality, as stated in the

UN Charter, is contravened by the very nature of the Security Council as established in the same

founding document, the right to rule is endangered (Steevens, 2016) .

Sovereignty

The General Assembly of the United Nations has placed a strong emphasis on the

principle of non-intervention in resolutions from the middle of the 1960s through the 1980s. In

the preambles of the Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties from 1969 and 1986, it is

mentioned as one of the principles of international law embodied in the Charter. The principle is

frequently brought up during UN discussions, diplomatic letters, and protests. However, it is

important to distinguish, albeit difficult to do so, between instances in which the term

"non-intervention" is employed as political rhetoric and those in which it is utilized to support a

legal position when evaluating state activity. One state's "intervention" in another's affairs is

necessary. Second, only "matters in which each State is permitted, by the principle of State

sovereignty, to decide freely" are subject to interference.

Barkin and Cronin (1994) stated that sovereignty in the international system has linked to

two separate types of system, namely the states, which are the territories which institutional

authorities practice legitimate authority, and second, nations, which are the “communities of

sentiment” that serve as the political foundation of governmental power. While both of which are

alike institutionally and structurally, they have different fundamentals in their sources of

legitimation as sovereign entities. The late medieval system's overlapping jurisdictions among

lords, kings, and clergy as well as the Church's transnational claims to political authority came to

an end with the recognition of the state as the ultimate power inside a well defined juridical

border in the seventeenth century.

Since 1945, several events have led states to foster growth in new forms such as

inter-state cooperation. The widening of the international society defined as a universal society.

This initiation started when smaller states started being decolonized and initiated the

incorporation of an international society consisting of multiple developing countries, with hopes

of fostering a community. During this era, it has also been noted that growth is no longer done

alone by each country, but a unified one. Interdependence among nations has grown and the fact

that issues concerning the global community now need global solutions has hastened the process

of creating an international community, a result of the state's realization of the concept of

international interdependence. Apart from this, the fall of the League of Nations has heightened

the participation and dedication to maintain peace; It will also influence a state's choice to form a

regional organization. Lastly, International Organizations have been heavily supported by

developing countries (comprising the majority of the international community). As stated, IO’s

offer a better footing in changing the structure of the international realm.

The Veto Players Theory

The impacts of veto theory (VP) on policymaking have been clarified and codified by VP

theory, which also postulated that a higher number of VPs and a more broad policy portfolio will

have a conservative effect on policy, making policy changes more challenging to implement. The

concept of a "VP" has gained popularity thanks to the work of George Tsebelis; the original

article has received hundreds of citations. It was created by Tsebelis as a framework for

comprehending policy stability. He acknowledged that while official veto rights are rarely

granted to political players in parliamentary democracies, certain groups frequently possess de

facto veto authority Q2 (Tsebelis, 1995a, b, 2002). Actors with the power to veto laws that are

less desirable than the current situation can so plainly influence how much policy is changed.

Because of this, in a one-dimensional policy space, two vice presidents on opposing sides of the

status quo will be unable to reach a consensus on a new, mutually advantageous policy (i.e., the

win set or set of viable alternative policies will be empty), leading to policy stability. A wide

range of phenomena, including the length of civil wars and wealth inequality, have been

successfully explained by this paradigm (Birchfield and Crepaz, 1998; Cunningham, 2006).

The fundamental concept shared by all VP strategies is straightforward: if some

individual or collective actor has the ability to veto decisions made by consensus; in other words,

will put it to use to accomplish her goals. She will particularly veto laws that go against her

wishes. Given that the veto power exists in politics, vice president justifications of legislative

procedures and results are highly credible from the outset. The growing importance of VP

directly derives from the idea that legislators are deliberate actors. We note behavior as when

actors do deliberate action, we assume that they are at least somewhat rational and that there is

an underlying structure to their tastes and views that is at least "fixed" for a while. It goes

without saying that VP arguments also support this. If preferences were believed to change

frequently, it would be challenging to establish whether an individual accepted a suggestion due

to a shift in their opinion about the ideal outcome or because they lacked the authority to

implement a better policy. This thought leads us to understand that debates primarily focus on

how institutions influence policy preferences rather than how actors' policies impact policy

output through institutions.

According to Ganghof (2011), a single or group of actors with the ability to veto

decisions is known as a veto player. in a certain manner and acts strategically. specific notions of

the fundamental idea must indicate, among other things, what the pertinent procedure is, who the

veto players and what drives them? The most widely accepted definition of veto George Tsebelis

(2002) created the concept of players in his veto player theory. Tsebelis uses the idea of the VP to

bring the comparison of several political systems. This unification includes conceptual

components. Tsebelis contends that conventional institutional divisions, such those between

Comparing presidential and parliamentary systems of administration or unicameral and

bicameral parliaments can be largely replaced by examining political systems and circumstances

as unique However, veto player theory additionally seeks to harmonize our causal

comprehension of politics. This causal unification's foundation is the idea of policy stability, or

the difficulty of altering the political system's current policies, or the "status quo." The causal

process that connects veto player configurations to policy stability specific results that are

significantly significant. Two instances: Tsebelis contends In legislative systems, where the

cabinet is dependent upon the trust of the Cabinet, instability is caused by stable assembly and

policies. In the event that the cabinet cannot decide on a policy shift, a replacement will be made.

Conversely, under presidential systems, veto players According to theory, policy stability is

likely to foster a coup or other type of instability in regimes. These two arguments are not

entirely new, and they can be debated, but the veto player idea incorporates both of these along

with numerous others into one comparatively economical and well-organized structure.

According to Wirkola (2010), the prevalent preferences of the actors involved and the

existing organizations significantly impact policy results. These outcomes depend on the political

power held by individuals and the current state of affairs (Tsebelis, 2002: 17). In the case of the

UN Security Council, its location and the presence of the five veto powers with substantial

influence contribute to its stability, making it unlikely to undergo any reform. The veto player

concept, like other hypotheses, aims to explain policy-making outcomes, such as the specific

instance mentioned. To better understand these results, it is essential to identify the agenda-setter,

the preferences of the VP, and the position of the status quo (Tsebelis, 2002: 3). Explaining the

results becomes more challenging when there is limited knowledge about these elements. For

example, the theory may be able to determine whether and why policy change is possible, but it

will not effectively explain actual change if it solely focuses on institutions without

understanding the players that shape them. The decisions made by the actors themselves will

ultimately determine whether or not real change occurs, even if the requirements for change are

identified (Tsebelis, 2002: 17).

International Law

The exact scope of the non-interference/non-intervention concept is far from clear,

despite its conventional position appearing to be uncontroversial. In fact, even though this idea

includes quite a few international agreements and International Court of Justice (ICJ) case law, it

is still uncertain exactly what is protected by this law and, conversely, what is not. While the

principle's general framework may be deemed unambiguous, its specific boundaries and range

remain highly debatable. The non-interference/non-intervention principle appears to encompass

two distinct tiers of rights and duties which reveals a separate aspect of the principle and is

implied by a different characteristic of sovereign states. The principle is enshrined in a number of

international instruments as well as customary international law. This paradox is made clear by

the UN General Assembly's Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention and Interference

in the Internal Affairs of States. The Declaration specifically states in article 1 that no State has

the right to interfere or intervene in any way, for any reason, in the internal or external affairs of

other States. Article 2 then lists a long list of rights and corresponding duties of states that make

up the non-interference/non-intervention principle. The right and duties written out in the

non-interference/non-intervention declaration are in lieu with the UN Charter (Aloupi, 2015).

There are undoubtedly many complicated issues surrounding states' absolute right to

employ authority in international relations as well as the bounds of that right. governments that

experience armed assaults or threats of such attacks will unavoidably view the situation

differently than governments that are not involved. When they experience an attack as well, the

latter's viewpoint is probably going to shift drastically. It is obvious that states that are involved

are biased; states that are not involved could be less obvious. However, history tends to

demonstrate that impartial states and outside observers are frequently exceedingly picky when

determining whether the use of force was appropriate and justifiable. If the force employed is not

manifestly at odds with jus in bello, they are unlikely to be critical of it when it occurs in

circumstances where they feel compassion for the state that is being victimized ... little to no

sympathy for the state or the organization that encouraged the state to employ force. But when a

state employs force against which they are neutral or openly opposed, or when they really

support some or all of the goals of the state or organization whose activities precipitated the use

of force, they are likely to condemn it as disproportionate. (Kretzmer, 2013).

According to Kretzmer (2013), “proportionality has been used variously in legal

perspectives”. It was utilized to differentiate two entirely different things. Occasionally, the

phrase alludes to the proportionality of an act and its rightful retaliation ("eye for an eye"). It is

necessary to respond proportionately to the behavior that prompted it. Similar to determining

criminal penalties, the sentence must be appropriate for the offense committed. Proportionality

also relates to a judgment of the harm created by means used to legitimate ends. The harm done

must not outweigh the potential perquisites of accomplishing those objectives. For instance,

proportionality in human rights law evaluates the harm that results from limitations on a

protected liberty in relation to the justifiable purposes for which those restrictions are intended.

Theoretical Framework

Veto Players Theory

According to Tsebelis' view, a veto player is someone who has the power to prevent

changes to the status quo. This is comparable to players in a game of negotiation where all

participants must come to a consensus. The ability to continuously express preferences over

public policy outcomes throughout the range of ongoing policy decisions that veto players must

make is a crucial characteristic of veto players. One analytical truth regarding the veto players is

that regardless of the number of vp, political stability does not decrease (changing the status quo

does not become easier, nor does it become more challenging). Tsebelis calls this the "analytical

truth", the consequence of the definition alone, which is logically conceivable no matter what

additional assumptions are made. In addition, there are two more presumptions: first, that the

locations of the various veto players in the policy space are widely known; and second, that the

veto power is exercised in accordance with their policy preferences and not in accordance with

other factors, like electoral objectives or appeals to their constituency.

The Veto Players Theory can be used to categorize and explain the nuances and dynamics

of the P-5 members in passing resolutions. By utilizing this model, the study can examine how

much legitimacy does the UN Security Council have in addressing global pressures, as part of

their duty.

Three Faces of Power

Steven Lukes (2005) introduces his academic theory of power by constructing a

“three-dimensional” account of power:

1. Decision-making: The first face of power introduced by Steven Lukes is the most

common form of power. decision-making processes often involve the consideration of the

current situation and the relations between the people making the decisions. This

dimension of power can be considered the “open face” as it is clear who are making

decisions and their motives to make such decisions

2. Agenda Setting: This face of power involves the actor's control of the situation where

decisions are made. An actor may shift the setting of the discussion to only address what

benefits them. Bachrach and Baratz (1962) explains this (non-verbatim) form of power as

the “extent that an actor consciously or unconsciously decides the scope of the

decision-making process. This can be seen in decisions made "behind closed doors and in

the ‘corridors of power’, where who is deciding and why is seldom clear.

3. Thought Control: This last face of power involves a manipulative approach to

decision-making. As Luke describes it “The most effective and insidious form of power

is to prevent… conflict from arising in the first place.” The ability to control people's

perception and thoughts to lead them to acceptance of biased decisions without question.

Lukes Three Faces of Power can help determine which issues receive attention and which

remain unnoticed, an aspect of power that goes beyond overt conflict and coercion. The

agenda-setting and non-decision-making aspects of Lukes's theory of power are consistent with

the operations of the Security Council, where the ability to shape the subjects of discussion has

important implications for maintaining international peace and security. The P5 members can

effectively stifle particular issues or initiatives by using their veto power, demonstrating the array

of methods in which power is expressed in international organizations like the UN Security

Council.

Conceptual Framework

This area describes the relationship of the concepts and variables utilized in this study. The

diagram visually explains the exploration of the research problem.

Figure 1. Relationship of Variables

Chapter III

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter introduces the research design, research environment, research method,

research instruments, research procedures, as well as the ethical considerations that are used in

this study. This chapter focuses on the explanation and elaboration of the processes involved in

the research.

Research Environment

The study takes place in the University of San Carlos - Downtown Campus and on the

global arena, both environments are important in conducting the study. The university will serve

as the main research lab in this study. Research procedures such as data collection, and data

analysis will mostly be conducted in this environment, as well as academic discussions by the

researchers. Moreover, the international arena will serve as the environment for analyzing the

power dynamics of each P-5 member of the Security Council. Each member state holds veto

powers that are an essential part in the international realm. The usage of veto power may reflect

the national interests and strategies of each member state. Through these research environments,

the researchers will be able to analyze the legitimacy of the UN Security Council and its

implications in the international arena.

The University of San Carlos - Downtown Campus, and the global arena are both feasible

environments that will help answer the research questions and generate findings on the

implications of the Security Council. By conducting the study in these environments, the study

can contribute to an in-depth analysis on the use of veto powers of the P-5 members of the

Security Council.

Research Design

The researchers will utilize a mixed method research design to conduct the study. This

type of research design according to Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004) is a combination of both

qualitative and quantitative research methods and approaches. This design aims to identify the

research questions and provide answers through exploratory sequential design. The exploratory

sequential design enables the researchers to explore the different concepts of how the members

use their veto power before validating it, and allows the researchers for greater versatility in

discovering trends and themes. The exploratory sequential design starts with qualitative data

collection and analysis of the vetoed resolutions. The qualitative data will then be subjected to

quantitative data analysis through data visualization techniques, which leads to interpretation.

This design is apt for the study as it is meant to explore the generalizability and provide a

statistical analysis on the frequency of the usage of veto power and the occurrences of

“deadlocks" during resolution drafting.

A document analysis method will be used to make insights. This method will analyze the

different vetoed resolution documents. The analytical process of this method includes finding,

selecting, interpreting, and synthesizing the data contained in the vetoed resolution documents.

The document analysis will interpret the data to draw out meanings and gain understanding from

the decisions of the members, as well as the “deadlocks” they reach when drafting the

resolutions. The documents acquired contain (1) the minutes of the meeting; (2) which

representative is talking at certain points of the meeting; (3) the information being said by each

speaker; (4) which permanent members vetoed a resolution; (5) and lastly, what issue is being

addressed in the meeting. After analyzing the resolutions, the quantitative data will be obtained

by employing data visualization techniques, such as graphs and tables, in order to determine the

trends and common themes on the frequency of the Permanent 5 members to veto a drafted

resolution. The quantitative findings will then be contextualized within the international arena.

By employing these methods, the study will be able to provide an explanation on the different

implications and roles of the Veto Powers in the UN Security Council.

Research Instruments

The veto resolution documents of the UN Security Council focusing on the decisions of

the P-5 members will be utilized as the primary source of data. The UNSC veto resolutions

include a record of the decision-making process of the Security Council, as well as the process of

how and when each member state has used their veto when drafting a resolution. By using these

materials of the UN Security Council, it allows the researchers to formulate the hypothesis, and

determine the design of the study.

Research Procedures

Gathering of Data

The study will utilize materials from the online database of the UN Security Council, as

well as various related articles, works of literature, studies, and books that helps understand the

implications of the veto power in the global arena. These materials will allow the researchers to

explore and comprehend the negative results associated with the P-5 members exercising their

veto powers. Through this, the data and information will be collected through online databases,

arranged by Dag Hammarskjöld Library, which cater to the wide scope of materials that is

beneficial to the success of the study.

Treatment of Data

After data gathering, the researchers will look into the drafted resolutions, and the data

collected will be analyzed using a document analysis method to explore relevant information

from each resolution to analyze the implications of the Veto Powers of the P-5 Members to the

Security Council. The researchers will use data visualization techniques, such as tables and

graphs to produce statistical analysis of the number of vetoed resolutions and passed resolutions.

The researchers seek to interpret the findings by identifying potential avenues for reforming the

Security Council.

Data Management

The researchers will store all gathered data, such as the resolution documents, and related

articles and studies on a Google Drive folder, only the researchers will be authorized to access

the folder. After the completion of this study, the researchers will ensure the confidentiality of

the files by deleting all existing copies of the acquired data, including drafted resolutions, legal

documents of the UN Security Council, and other related documents found online.

Ethical Considerations

To establish and safeguard highest ethical standards in conducting this research, the

researchers will strictly observe the following principles:

The data was collected from the UN Security Council through its online database

adhering to the rules and regulations of the organization.

The researchers ensure the confidentiality of the data by storing it in a secured folder, and

only the researchers have authorized access to it.

Proper document sourcing or referencing of materials was done to ensure and promote

copyright laws. Related articles and studies that support the research were valued by giving

respect to the proponents.

Appropriate research methods are used to analyze and examine the documents without

infringing the confidentiality of the data.

Lastly, the researchers acknowledged the responsibility of upholding the integrity of the

study by being transparent in presenting the findings, and avoiding manipulation or

misrepresentation of the data gathered.

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